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Curbing Copyblight
John Tehranian*
ABSTRACT

This Article identifies and analyzes the growing problem of
"copyblight" the use of overreaching claims by putative copyright
holders to ownership of public domain works, and, more broadly, to
exclusive rights which they do not hold in copyrighted works. Despite
the fact that copyblight circumscribes political and social discourse,
stifles creativity, and constricts the dissemination of information,
present law provides few, if any, disincentives against the practice.
Building on the groundbreaking work of Paul Heald and Jason
Mazzone, this Article advances three proposals to temper the problems
of overreach in order to restore a needed balance in our copyright
system: (1) strengthening section 512(f) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to provide a more viable claim against those who make
false representationsto force the removal of allegedly infringingcontent
online; (2) forcing the adoption of an evenhanded approach to the
assessment of fees in copyright cases-something that many trial courts
have failed to do despite the explicit exhortations of the Supreme Court
and the significant policy interest at stake; and (3) resurrectinga qui
tam civil cause of action for false "markings"under the Copyright Act
in order to disincentivize the presently ubiquitous use of fraudulent
legal language that erodes and chills protected user activities. As a
society, we rightfully offer meaningful remedies for the infringement of
legitimate owner rights. It only makes sense to offer meaningful
remedies for the infringement of legitimate user rights.

*
C 2012 John Tehranian. Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law, Southwestern Law
School & Biederman Entertainment & Media Law Institute. Portions of this Article are based on
the author's book, John Tehranian, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU (2011). The
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the participants of the Symposium, including Michael Carroll, Maggie Chon, James
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The minacious language appears at the beginning of almost
Book publishers
any commercially distributed creative work.
11
admonish that "[a] rights [are] reserved," and that "[n]o part of this
publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form ... without
permission in writing from the publisher."' The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) cautions that "[t]he unauthorized reproduction or
distribution" of CDs, DVDs and video games "is illegal." 2 Indeed, the
average person confronts stern warnings about the dire consequences
of copyright infringement multiple times per day. While assertions of
legal rights can serve a useful purpose, and are not unusual in any
field of human endeavor, there is something distinctly troubling about
certain copyright warnings. As it turns out, many of them are not
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1028, 1040 n.67 (2006) (quoting
1.
TERRY L. JORDAN, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 2 (7th ed. 1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Anti-Piracy Warning Seal, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ipr/
2.
anti-piracy (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). Since August 2006, use of the FBI's seal with its stern
warning was limited to big content holders' products-namely, members of the Recording
Industry Association of America, Business Software Alliance, Entertainment Software
Association, Software & Information Industry Association and the Motion Picture Association of
America. Id. Since late 2011, however, the FBI has allowed anyone to make use of Anti-Piracy
Warning Seal on copyrighted content. David Kravets, Now We Can All Use the FBI Anti-Piracy
Warning!, WIRED (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/fbiantipiracy-logo.
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simply
aggressive;
they
frequently
contain
outright
misrepresentations about the nature and scope of copyright law.3
Even more significantly, these exhortations to avoid any use of a
copyrighted work without the express written permission of the
putative copyright holder are not mere inconveniences. Rather, by
choking off economic competition, increasing the costs of goods and
services, restricting legitimate fair use rights, and silencing free
speech, these warnings have serious societal consequences. 4 In short,
the negative externalities of overbroad copyright claims impact all
aspects of modern life. All the while, however, present law does little
to disincentivize such illegitimate assertions of rights.
This Article explores the growing problem of "copyblight"-the
use of overreaching claims by putative copyright holders to ownership
of public domain works,' and, more broadly, to exclusive rights that
they do not hold in copyrighted works.6 Building on a growing body of
literature on the subject, especially the groundbreaking work of Paul
Heald and Jason Mazzone, 7 this Article identifies some key areas in
which copyblight threatens the public weal by circumscribing political
and social discourse, stifling creativity, and constricting the
dissemination of information. In the process, this Article examines
both the causes of and potential solutions to the problem of copyblight.
Though the analysis here is by no means exhaustive, this
Article specifically assesses three plausible reforms that, taken
together, might temper the harms caused by overreaching claims to
ownership of and exclusive rights in creative works. First, given the
increasing importance of the Internet as a vehicle for the distribution
of user-generated content, Congress could provide more bite to the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) section 512(f)-the
provision that penalizes putative rights holders from making false
representations to effect the takedown of allegedly infringing content
online.8 Second, in light of the massive cost of litigation and the
critical public policy interests at stake, courts should take a more
evenhanded approach to the assessment of attorneys' fees in copyright
3.
See infra Part II.
4.
See infra Part II.
5.
Jason Mazzone has famously dubbed this practice of "claiming falsely a copyright in
a public domain work" as "copyfraud." Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1028.
6.
This Article uses the term "copyblight" with a sense of remorse for adding yet
another neologism to the annals of law review literature. That said, copyblight is broader than
Jason Mazzone's term "copyfraud" and encompasses any manner of overreaching claims to
copyright protection. Moreover, the term "blight" also emphasizes the corrosive, viral nature of
the practice.
7.
See generally Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights: Four
Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994); Mazzone, supra note 1.

8.

17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006).
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cases-something that many trial courts have failed to do despite the
explicit exhortations of the U.S. Supreme Court. 9 Third, Congress
should recognize the significant harm that copyblight inflicts on the
legitimate access and use rights of consumers to creative works.
Congress can do this by reviving an expurgated and long-forgotten
provision of nineteenth-century federal law, a qui tam cause of action
for false markings under the Copyright Act.
Taken together, these three reforms could go a long way toward
combating copyblight. Reform of section 512 would help avoid the
overexertion of rights that work to achieve the improper takedown of
legitimate online content. Actual adoption of a more evenhanded
approach to fees awards would deter in terrorem litigation by
overaggressive rights holders bent on stifling permissible access to
Also, the resurrection of a false
and use of copyrighted works.
"marking" claim under the Copyright Act would help prevent baseless
ownership assertions over public domain works and disincentivize the
pernicious, widespread use of fraudulent legal language to erode and
chill legitimate user activities.
All told, this Article's proposals provide a more balanced legal
playing field that would ultimately serve the copyright regime's goal of
After all, while copyright users expose
progress in the arts.
themselves to staggering penalties, both civil and criminal, for
infringing activities,10 putative rights holders face few consequences
for illegitimate assertions of rights. However, the reforms suggested
here are not meant to privilege copyright consumers over valid
copyright holders. Instead, by addressing one of the more troubling
aspects of our copyright regime, these proposals would bolster respect
for actual copyright law and, in turn, provide greater legitimacy to
responsible copyright holders who seek to enforce their valid rights.
I. FROM COPYRIGHT TO COPYBLIGHT
A. Owner's Rights, User's Rights, and Copyblight
Users pay a high price under the law if they run afoul of a
copyright holder's exclusive rights secured under 17 U.S.C. § 106. For
timely-registered works, infringers face statutory damages in the

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (holding that "[pirevailing
9.
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike" under section 505, the Copyright
Act's attorney's fees recovery provision).
10.
John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543-48.
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amount of up to $150,000 per willful act." In the digital age, these
numbers can add up quickly. Doctoral candidate Joel Tenenbaum was
famously on the receiving end of a bankrupting judgment in the
amount of $645,000 in statutory damages for "sharing" thirty songs on
a peer-to-peer network. 12 Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a single mother of
four who earned her living working as a natural-resources coordinator
for a Native American tribe in Minnesota, suffered a $1.92 million
judgment after being found liable for "sharing" twenty-four songs on a
peer-to-peer network.' 3
Although such judgments seem staggering, Tenenbaum and
Thomas-Rasset enjoyed lenient treatment compared to some other
infringers. Jack Yates, a twenty-eight year old who worked for a
duplication company charged with making promotional copies of the
Michael Myers movie The Love Guru, made the mistake of burning an
unauthorized copy of the movie. 14 This copy, marked with a digital
fingerprint that traced back to Yates, eventually made its way onto
the Internet, where it was allegedly downloaded more than 85,000
times. 15 For his actions, the government charged Yates with criminal
copyright infringement and sentenced him to six months in a federal
prison. 16 Kevin Cogill, a blogger who posted nine tracks from Guns N'
Roses's long-awaited album, Chinese Democracy, on his website
shortly before the songs' release in 2008, saw police raid his home and
arrest him-at gunpoint-for violating federal copyright law.17 In the
face of a potential five-year prison term and a $250,000 fine, he pled
guilty to the charges and prosecutors sought a six-month sentence.18
In short, those who infringe the exclusive rights of copyright holders

11.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.").
12.
Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490-91 (1st Cir. 2011).
13.
See Chris Williams, Big Fine Could Be Big Trouble in Downloading Case,
PHYSORG.COM (June 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.cominewsl64653697.html (noting that Tom
Sydnor, the director of the Progress & Freedom Foundation's Center for the Study of Digital
Property, defended the verdict by arguing that "[1]egally acquiring a license to give copies of a
song to potentially millions of Kazaa users might well have cost $80,000 per song" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
14.
See Richard Lawson, How The Love Guru Could Cost You Half a Year of Your Life,
GAWKER (June 19, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://gawker.com/5296843/how-the-love-guru-could-costyou-half-a-year-of-your-life.
15.
See 'Love Guru' Costs Dumbass 6 Months of Freedom, TMZ (June 19, 2009, 9:15
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2009/06/19/love-guru-costs-dumbass-6-months-of-freedom.
16.
Id.
17.
See David Kravets, Feds Demand Prison for Guns N' Roses Uploader, WIRED (Mar.
13, 2009, 4:37 PM), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/03/feds-demand-6-m.html.
18.
Id.

998

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:4:993

face severe civil liability and, even worse, time in a federal
penitentiary.
By sharp contrast, those who engage in copyblight and infringe
the rights of users in creative works face few consequences. So long as
the drafter of a takedown notification under the DMCA 19 does not
manifest subjective bad faith intent, she will face no liability for
causing the removal of (perfectly legitimate) material, even if the
takedown notice makes wildly outlandish claims to copyright
protection. 20 No federal civil cause of action exists for false copyright
regarding copyright
markings, fraudulent misrepresentations
ownership, or outright untruths about the scope of one's alleged rights
Finally, despite some limited success, 21
to a copyrighted work.
attempts to fight copyblight with other federal laws, such as unfair
competition statutes, have faced numerous difficulties. 22 Courts have
frequently held that false copyright notices by themselves do not
constitute false designations of origin under section 43(a)(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act. 2 3 Meanwhile, attempts to impose liability for false
copyright claims through the Lanham Act's false advertising
provisions have faced similar challenges. 24 Some circuits hold that
false advertising claims under section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act 2 5
require competitor standing, 26 thereby precluding impacted consumers
from seeking relief for false statements regarding the nature of a
copyright. Even when competitors bring suit, courts have found that

19.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).

20.
See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1298-1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
21.
that a false copyright notice coupled with a false claim of ownership to a computer program can
give rise to a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which proscribes false designations of
origin).
See, e.g., Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that, "as a
22.
matter of law, a false copyright notice alone cannot constitute a false designation of origin within
the meaning of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act").
23.
See, e.g., id. But see Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 37
(2d Cir. 1982) (finding section 43(a) liability where the infringing product contained both a false
copyright notice and the additional representation that the product was "original," thereby
"mislead[ing] consumers into believing that the clothing they purchased is a unique novelty
instead of a common copy" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, the Supreme Court's
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. calls into question future attempts
to fight copyblight through the Lanham Act's claim for false designation of origin. See 539 U.S.
23, 31-33 (2003). As Dastar held, the Lanham Act's use of the term "origin" is limited to the
source of the tangible good sold, not the source of the ideas that the tangible good might embody.
Id.
24.
See Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d
1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that plaintiff lacked competitive standing under the false
advertising prong of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
25.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
26.
See Jack Russell TerrierNetwork, 407 F.3d at 1037.
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false copyright notices alone "[are] not very likely to influence
consumer purchasing decisions."2 7 Despite earlier hopes that state
deceptive practices acts may hold "promise" as a means to "jolt"
industries into compliance with the law and away from "spurious
claims of copyright," 28 the use of state and common law causes of
action to combat copyblight remains relatively "untested" and the
benefits of such claims could be limited. 29 As a result, it should come
as little surprise that improper claims of copyright ownership and
rights are ubiquitous. 30 In fact, since there is little to deter such
activities and the cost is minimal, one could even argue that for-profit
corporations would be remiss in their duties to their shareholders if
they did not attempt to expand the scope of their copyrights through
such claims.
After all, intellectual property rights have grown
increasingly valuable in the post-manufacturing economy and
companies will naturally attempt to extract as much surplus from the
exploitation of those rights as possible-especially if there are few, if
any, adverse consequences to attempts at overreach.
As this state of affairs continues unmitigated, public welfare
suffers. Widespread access to the global network-the lattice of
personal computers and smartphones at the fingertips of all members
of modern societies-has dramatically expanded the ability of
individuals to make uses of creative works in ways that may
potentially implicate the Copyright Act.31 Many of these uses
constitute infringement; yet many others-including the exploitation
of works whose copyright term has run, the fair use of works still
under copyright protection, and the utilization of materials that lie
outside of the subject matter of copyright-do not. Copyblight chills
these latter uses and disrupts the delicate balance between owner and
user rights in our copyright regime.
B. The Growing Problem of Copyblight
The adverse consequences of overreaching copyright claims are
widespread, stymieing expressive rights and squelching legitimate
social, political, and economic discourse in myriad ways. Consider, for
instance, the impact of litigation threats, grounded in tenuous claims
27.
See EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 76 F.3d 487, 492 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting
a false advertising claim based on the fixation of a false copyright symbol on a troll doll and
cautioning against allowing plaintiffs to "convert all improper copyright claims into Lanham Act
violations").
28.
Heald, supra note 7, at 282.
29.
Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1094-96.
30.
See id. at 1026.
31.
See Tehranian, supra note 10, at 537, 548-49.
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of intellectual property rights, on the dissemination of consumer
information and suppressing speech. 32 Though it is an axiomatic
principal of copyright law that facts do not enjoy protection, 33 recent
headlines are replete with examples of companies claiming exclusive
rights to elementary consumer information. 34 For example, to prevent
pricing information from spilling onto the Internet and to deter web
surfers from taking full advantage of the transparency and
dissemination possible on a global network, some corporations have
begun to claim a copyright interest in their basic retail data. 35 In
2002, Wal-Mart ended up in a dispute with FatWallet, which is an
online forum for consumers to share discounts and pricing
information. 36 A FatWallet user had posted details of the products
and prices scheduled to appear in advertisements for Wal-Mart's
annual Black Friday sale on the day after Thanksgiving. 37 Wal-Mart
issued a takedown notification to FatWallet, demanding it remove the
post on the grounds it violated Wal-Mart's copyrights. 38 Although
Wal-Mart eventually backed down on its attempt to subpoena
FatWallet for the identity of the poster, it did manage to get the
information removed from the website. 39 Apparently, Wal-Mart has
continued its takedown notifications undeterred ever since. 40 Other
retailers, such as OfficeMax, Best Buy, and Staples, have used the
DMCA for similar purposes. 41 Even if the law does not consider the
content to be facts (which are wholly uncopyrightable), 4 2 but rather a
compilation of facts (entitled to thin protection given sufficient

See, e.g., Cory Tadlock, Comment, Copyright Misuses, Fair Use, and Abuse: How
32.
Sports and Media Companies are OverreachingTheir Copyright Protections,7 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 621, 634-35 (2008) (noting that content creators and distributors often overstate
their rights, thereby "hinder[ing] the public's ability to make any meaningful use of the material,
contrary to the purposes of copyright law").
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); see also Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d
33.
1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that facts cannot be copyrighted).
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Wal-Mart Backs Away from DMCA Claim, CNET, Dec.
34.
5, 2002, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-976296.html.
35.
See, e.g., id.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Mike Masnick, Wal-Mart Now Going After Search Engines for Linking to Sites with
40.
Black Friday Ads, TECHDIRT (Nov. 14, 2008, 10:31 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20081113/1511542826.shtml.
41.
See McCullagh, supra note 34.
42.
See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) ("This case
concerns the interaction of two well-established propositions. The first is that facts are not
copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are.").
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originality), 43 its unauthorized use is nevertheless subject to a strong
fair use defense. 44 In this way, the tactics of Wal-Mart and other
retailers to limit the availability of their pricing information online
likely do not have support under the law, but they have nonetheless
succeeded because of the threat of litigation.
Interestingly, for-profit corporations have not been alone in
advancing these aggressive, if not wholly misguided, interpretations of
copyright law. Institutions such as Harvard University have also
taken such positions, despite educational missions that would
seemingly support free-market price competition and the sharing of
information and facts (the truth, or veritas, as Harvard's motto would
have it).45 In 2007, the venerable Harvard Coop, the University's
official bookstore, started calling the police whenever they noticed a
student jotting down the names and prices of books assigned for
various courses. 46 Concerned about online price competition, the Coop
claimed copyright protection over its book lists, including titles and
prices, and informed law enforcement officials that these individuals
were infringing the store's intellectual property. 4 7 Noting the irony,
the Harvard Crimson reported "taking notes in class may be
encouraged, but apparently it can get you kicked out of the Coop."4 8
Harvard University is not alone in its regressive stance on
copyright-a position that increases the cost of higher education. 49
Leading university presses, along with other academic publishers,
have asserted overreaching copyright claims that directly lead to
increases in the costs of books and other educational materials for
students in two ways.5 0 First, they have repeatedly taken the position
43.
See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 663 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that
compilations of facts get only limited copyright protection because copyright law protects only
the "expression of an idea," not the idea itself).
44.
See Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade Chi., 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(noting that, in a fair use analysis, authors of factual compilations are "held to grant broader
licenses for subsequent use than persons whose work is truly creative").
45.
See Harvard at a Glance, HARv. U., http://www.harvard.edu/harvard-glance (last
visited Mar. 26, 2012).
46.
See Gabriel J. Daly, Coop Discourages Notetaking in Bookstore, HARV. CRIMSON,
Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/9/19/coop-discourages-notetaking-inbookstore-taking.
47.
Angela Kang, John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Wendy M. Seltzer, Has Sense Flown the Coop?,
HARV. CRIMSON, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2007/9/26/has-sense-flownthe-coop-last.
48.
Daly, supra note 46.
49.
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1393-94 (6th Cir.
1996) (Martin, J., dissenting) ("By charging permission fees on this kind of job, publishers will
pass on expenses to colleges and universities that will, of course, pass such fees on to students.
Students may also be harmed if added expenses and delays cause professors to opt against
creating such specialized anthologies for their courses.").
50.
See id.
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that any unauthorized use of their copyrighted works, no matter how
small, constitutes an act of infringement.5 1 Under this position, even
a one-paragraph reproduction of a one-thousand-page book could incur
liability. To cite a small smattering of examples, books published by
Princeton University Press contain a copyright warning dictating "[n]o
part of this book may be reproduced in any form ... without
permission in writing from the publisher."52 Another publisher,
Cengage Learning, asserts any republication, reproduction, or
redistribution of any content from its works "is prohibited without the
Also, Pearson
prior written consent of Cengage Learning." 53
Education categorically proclaims dissemination of any "parts" of any
of its works "is not permitted," and that materials from its works
"should never be made available to students except by instructors
using the accompanying text in their classes." 54 All of these
statements are untrue as a matter of law and, among other things,
ignore the existence of the fair use doctrine, as embodied in section
107 of the Copyright Act.5 5
Second, university presses and other academic publishers
regularly engage in a practice Jason Mazzone has dubbed
"copyfraud"-the act of "claiming falsely a copyright in a public
domain work." 56 In his groundbreaking work on the subject, Mazzone
gives a quintessential yet particularly stunning example of the
practice: a pocket version of the U.S. Constitution that sternly warns
against reproducing the work without written permission from the
publisher. 7 As Mazzone quips, "[w]hatever the Constitution's framers
and ratifiers had in mind when they authorized Congress to create
copyright law, they surely did not expect that somebody would one day
claim a copyright in the Constitution itself."58 It seems that, if it were
up to some publishers, even those attempting to use works in the
public domain (such as the Constitution) would face liability for
copyright infringement.
Moreover, the problem is not limited to the Constitution. As
Mazzone points out, copyfraud is omnipresent:
See Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1049 ("Books published nowadays carry copyright
51.
notices that suggest de minimis copying and fair use are nonexistent.").
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
52.
JUSTICE (1973) (quoting the notice on the copyright page).
Copyright Notices, CENGAGE LEARNING, http://www.cengage.com/copyright (last
53.
visited Mar. 9, 2012).
Terms of Use, PEARSON: INT'L RIGHTS MGMT. GRP., http://rights.pearsoned.com/
54.
index.cfm?a-cat&cid=7605 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
55.
Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1028.
56.
See id.
57.
Id.
58.
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False copyright notices appear on modern reprints of Shakespeare's plays, Beethoven's
piano scores, greeting card versions of Monet's Water Lilies, and even the U.S.
Constitution. Archives claim blanket copyright in everything in their collections.
Vendors of microfilmed versions of historical newspapers assert copyright ownership.
These false copyright claims, which are often accompanied by threatened litigation for
reproducing a work without the 'owner's' permission, result in users seeking licenses
59
and paying fees to reproduce works that are free for everyone to use.

Exacerbating the problem, the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a
private not-for-profit organization charged by major publishers with
the collection of reproduction and other usage fees, provides a
stunning example of copyfraud in action. Through the CCC, many
publishers demand licensing fees for the photocopying of materials
that are indisputably in the public domain.6 0 Often, the CCC collects
these fees from educational institutions and, ultimately, students who
are making educational use of these works.6 1 In the process, the
publishers misrepresent that any use of such works requires
permission from and payment to them, when, as a matter of law, it
does not require such permission and payment. For example, various
publishers demand payment via the CCC for the reproduction of any

portion of The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Henry David
Thoreau's Walden (1854), Charles Darwin's The Expression of the
Emotions of Man and Animals (1872), or Jane Austen's Sense and

Sensibility (1811).62
As it turns out, the publishers' ability to demand such
payments is highly suspect. William Shakespeare (1564-1616) lived
before the passage of the Statute of Anne (1710), the world's first
modern copyright act. 6 3 Copyright law therefore did not even exist
when Shakespeare authored his plays and poems and, as a result, his
works never enjoyed copyright protection and have always belonged to
the public domain. 64 Similarly, Austen's Sense and Sensibility and

Darwin's The Expression and Emotions of Man and Animals never
enjoyed protection in the United States. 65 They were first published in

59.
Id. at 1026.
60.
See Heald, supra note 7, at 259-60.
61.
See Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1060, 1063 (noting that students ultimately absorb
CCC fees since they are instructed by professors to purchase course packets).
62.
See Copyright Licensing Requests for Specific Works of Authorship, COPYRIGHT
CLEARANCE CENTER, http://www.copyright.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (enter name of
desired work in "Get Permission" search bar; then choose desired work from results page; then
follow "Permissions Options" hyperlink to purchase copyright license).
63.

See William Shakespeare Biography, COMPLETE WORKS WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,

http://www.shakespeare-literature.com/Lbiography.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
64.
See Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the United States,
CORNELL U. COPYRIGHT INFO. CENTER (Jan. 3, 2012), http://copyright.cornell.eduiresources/
publicdomain.cfm.
65.
Id.; see also Mazzone, supra note 1, at 1040.
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the United Kingdom, and British authors did not receive copyright
protection in the United States until 1891.66 Finally, works like
Thoreau's, which were published before 1923, no longer possess
copyright protection in the United States because their terms have
expired.67 These are but a few examples of the rampant practice of
demanding licensing fees for the use of public domain materials. 68 All
told, it is unknown how many millions of dollars the major publishing
companies wrest from college students each year for the photocopying
of works that are, in fact, not copyrighted. These improper claims
undoubtedly contribute to the increasing cost of higher education.
Meanwhile, claims of copyright ownership in emails and other
correspondence have also grown, with dizzying effect. Indeed, tenuous
copyright assertions have even extended to the very notifications
An overly aggressive
through which suit is threatened.
cease-and-desist letter to a sympathetic defendant can generate a
firestorm of bad publicity for the attorney's client, especially in the
Internet age. 69 As a result, in an apparent fit of sudden publicity
shyness, lawyers have begun to claim copyrights in their letters to
prevent the unauthorized dissemination of these missives by their
recipients.7 0 For example, in 2007 a furniture outlet named DirectBuy
learned several websites contained comments about the company and
its services (calling it a "scam" and a "nightmare") that it considered
defamatory.71 In fact, the websites were consumer-oriented pages that
allowed users of infomercial products to provide reviews, commentary,
and criticism regarding the products and their producers' sales
tactics. 72 DirectBuy's attorneys, Dozier Internet Law, P.C., promptly
fired off a cease-and-desist letter to the websites' owners.73 The letter
was rather mundane, except for its conclusion, which warned: "Please
Chace Act, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110 (1891). It was not until the passage of the
66.
International Copyright Act of 1891, also known as the Chace Act, that foreign authors finally
enjoyed copyright protection in the United States. Id.
67.
See Hirtle, supra note 64.
See STEPHEN FISHMAN, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: How To FIND & USE COPYRIGHT-FREE
68.
WRITINGS, MUSIC, ART & MORE 24-25 (Richard Stim ed., 5th ed. 2010) (noting the widespread
use of tactics "to intimidate the public into paying permission fees or royalties for works that
should be free for all to use").
See David Bell, Tips for Addressing Brand Misuse While Mitigating PR Backlash,
69.
2 7
2
SOC. MEDIA MARKETING MAG. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.smmmagazine.com/blog/ 011/1 /0 /tipsfor-addressing-brand-misuse-while-mitigating-pr-backlash ("One overly aggressive notice could
land a full-page blog post, thousands of re-tweets, and negative publicity.").
Sam Bayard, Copyright Misuse and Cease-and-Desist Letters, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW
70.
PROJECT (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.citmedialaw.org/copyright-misuse-and-cease-and-desistletters.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
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be aware that this letter is copyrighted by our law firm, and you are
not authorized to republish this is [sic] any manner. Use of this letter
in a posting, in full or in part, will subject you to further legal causes
of action."74 Of course, such a tactic was nothing more than a thinly
veiled attempt to preclude the negative publicity that DirectBuy's
cease-and-desist letter might yield and to stifle the websites' free
speech rights. Ostensibly, the strategy paid dividends. According to
DirectBuy's attorneys, no one had ever dared publish their
cease-and-desist letters before.7 5 In the end, however, the owner of
the websites refused to let DirectBuy intimidate him. His attorneys,
Citizen Litigation Group (PCLG), placed the
the Public
cease-and-desist letter prominently on its website, daring Dozier to
litigate the issue.76 Dozier never sued.
C. ProfessionalSports and Copyblight: A Case Study
Indeed, the creative work distributed by major content
providers is replete with overreaching claims that ultimately chill
legally protected activities. For example, sports fans are all too
familiar with the requisite copyright warnings that accompany every
televised professional athletic event. For years, at least once during
each Major League Baseball (MLB) game, an announcer has dutifully
informed viewers:
[t]his copyrighted telecast is presented by authority of the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball [and/or INSERT YOUR FAVORITE TEAM NAME]. It may not be reproduced
or retransmitted in any form, and the accounts and descriptions of this game may not be
disseminated, without the express written consent [of INSERT YOUR FAVORITE
77
TEAM NAME]."

74.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
77.
Thomas Claburn, Tech Group Fights Copyright Absolutism at the FTC,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 1, 2007, 6:40 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/201202497;
see, e.g., Terms of Use Agreement, MLB.COM (Feb. 3, 2012), http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/
about mlb comlterms of use.jsp; see also MLB Productions: Frequently Asked Questions,
(last visited
MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/video/mlb-productions/feature.jsp?content-faq
Sept. 29, 2009). The agreement states:
Except for Submitted Content (defined below), the MLBAM Properties are either
owned by or licensed to MLBAM. The applicable owners and licensors retain all rights
to the MLBAM Properties, including, but not limited to all copyright, trademark and
other proprietary rights, however denominated. Except for downloading one copy of
the MLBAM Properties on any single computer for your personal, non-commercial
home use, you must not reproduce, prepare derivative works based upon, distribute,
perform or display the MLBAM Properties without first obtaining the written
permission of MILBAM or otherwise as expressly set forth in the terms and conditions
of the MLBAM Properties. The MLBAM Properties must not be used in any
unauthorized manner.
Terms of Use Agreement, supra.
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Other professional sports leagues broadcast similarly stern
admonishments. The National Football League (NFL), for example,
warns that "[tlhis copyrighted telecast is property of the NFL. Any
rebroadcast, retransmission or any other use of this telecast without
78
the express written permission of the NFL is strictly prohibited."
Of course, there is nothing particularly unusual about a
corporation trumpeting its rights. However, the gross inaccuracy of
these warnings' legal conclusions is particularly troubling. With their
uncompromising air of certitude and authority, these bold declarations
misrepresent the law and the rights the leagues enjoy.
Consider MLB's famed legalese. First, its copyright warning
entirely neglects the existence of the fair use doctrine, which allows
the unauthorized use of broadcasts to occur without liability under
certain conditions.7 9 Besides being firmly embedded in the federal
Copyright Act, fair use is arguably a constitutionally mandated First
Amendment check on the copyright monopoly. As such, it allows
exploitation of creative works for such purposes as commentary or
For
criticism without the permission of the copyright holder.80
example, unauthorized use of MLB footage to demonstrate the
changing physique of the average slugger through the years for a
presentation on performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs) might well
constitute fair use.8 1 In such circumstances, a user would possess a
complete defense to charges of copyright infringement, even in the
face of explicit demands by MLB to refrain from using its footage. The
copyright warnings of MLB and the NFL conveniently omit any
mention of the fair use rights that all members of the public enjoy.
This stance resembles similarly glib efforts by other segments of the
content-creation industry to downplay or entirely gloss over fair use
rights. 82 After all, many content creators and distributors routinely
insist that any exploitation of a work, no matter how small, requires a
license. 83
Second, while MLB's copyright warning prohibits any
unauthorized retransmissions, the law says otherwise. For example,
Gary Rayno, NFL Tells Movie Theater Chain Not to Show Game, N.H. UNION
78.
2
LEADER, Feb. 2, 2008, http://www.townunderground.com/forum/index.php?topic=1399.0;wap ;
Nov.
updated
(last
see Website Terms and Conditions, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/help/terms
16, 2011).
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
79.
See id.
80.
See, e.g., BIGGER STRONGER FASTER* (Magnolia Pictures 2008) (showing images of,
81.
among others, Barry Bonds and Mark McGwire in a discussion about steroids).
See, e.g., Permissions, RANDOM HOUSE, INC., http://www.randomhouse.comlaboutl
82.
permissions.html (last visited March 24, 2012) ("Written permission is required from the
publisher if you wish to reproduce any of our material."); see also Mazzone, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Permisions,supra note 82; see also Mazzone, supra note 1.
83.
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the Copyright Act allows both cable and satellite operators to
retransmit broadcasts without the authorization of copyright holders,
so long as the operators pay a statutory licensing fee. 8 4 In some cases,
such as the retransmission of broadcasts of local television stations by
cable and satellite operators, the license is virtually royalty-free. 85
Third, MLB's apparent recognition of only express written
Admittedly, federal
permissions stands on shaky legal ground.
copyright law requires that any exclusive license be in writing.8 6
However, as courts have repeatedly recognized, an individual can
obtain a nonexclusive license to exploit a copyrighted work either
orally or by conduct, even in the absence of any express written
consent.8 7
Fourth, MLB's attempt to monopolize all "accounts" of a game
under the aegis of federal copyright law is deeply problematic. MLB
undoubtedly owns a copyright to particular descriptions of its game by
its broadcasters. However, the phrasing of MLB's copyright statement
suggests a claim of ownership to something more.88 MLB's recent
litigation posture confirms this suspicion. Over the past few years,
MLB has asserted property rights in player names and statistics and
has demanded fantasy baseball operators obtain a license for the right
to market their services to the public. 89 In short, MLB has used an
expansive view of its own property rights to profit more directly from
the rapidly increasing popularity of fantasy baseball, a sizeable
fraction of the $1.5 billion fantasy sports industry.9 0
Significantly, the merits of MLB's legal claims on this front
have left actual courts less than impressed. Although MLB had
See 17 U.S.C. § i1 (allowing cable operators to retransmit both local and distant
84.
over-the-air television and radio broadcasts); id. § 119 (allowing satellite carriers to retransmit
distant over-the-air television broadcasts for private viewing); id. § 122 (allowing satellite
carriers to retransmit local over-the-air television broadcasts for private and commercial
viewing).
Id. §§ 111, 122 (subjecting the operators to a minimum basic royalty).
85.
86.
Id. § 101 (defining a "transfer of copyright ownership" as including "an assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright
or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright"); id. § 204(a) (dictating a "transfer of
copyright ownership" is not valid unless it is in writing).
87.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 1998); Lulirama Ltd. v.
Axcess Broad. Servs., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997).
See Mike Masnick, MLB Refuses to Give Permission to Guy to Describe Game to a
88.
Friend, TECHDIRT (Sept. 4, 2009, 7:30 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090904/
0304256103.shtml (challenging MLB's copyright notice prohibiting any "account of this game" as
an encroachment on fair use and an example of copyright overreach).
89.
See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
90.
See Abbey Klaassen, Fantasy Sports Generate Booming New Online Ad Market, AD
AGE DIGITAL (Aug. 8, 2006), http://adage.com/article/digital/fantasy-sports-generate-boomingonline-ad-market/ 110891.
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previously been able to wrest licenses from most operators,
negotiations between MLB and a Missouri fantasy baseball company,
CBC Distribution, broke down in 2005.91 CBC Distribution sued MLB
in federal court, seeking declaratory relief for its right to use player
Ultimately, CBC
names and statistics without a license. 92
Distribution prevailed, as the trial court rejected both MLB's
copyright and right of publicity claims. 93 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit agreed, finding that the names and statistics of
baseball players were information "in the public domain." 94 In June
2008, the Supreme Court denied MLB's petition for certiorari,
effectively ending the dispute, at least within the Eighth Circuit (for
copyright law) and in Missouri (for right of publicity law).95 Thus,
according to the only reported decision on the matter, MLB does not
have an intellectual property right to its players' names and statistics.
Undeterred, however, MLB implicitly continues to claim this right
through its unchanged copyright warning. 96
The copyright reach of the professional sports leagues has
grown so expansive that, like DirectBuy, they have even fought
unauthorized reproduction of their own legal warnings. Attorney and
academic Wendy Seltzer discovered this firsthand when she posted a
brief snippet from Super Bowl XLI on YouTube so students in her
class could hear the NFL's copyright warning for themselves.97
Seltzer was using the video as an educational tool and an example to
demonstrate the ways in which entities overreach in claims about
their intellectual property rights.98 The demonstration went far better
than Seltzer could have ever imagined. Within days, YouTube had
received a takedown demand from the NFL, which claimed Seltzer's
posting of the clip infringed its copyright. 99 YouTube acceded to
preserve its Internet Service Provider (ISP) safe harbor from liability
91.
See C.B.C. Distrib., 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.
92.
See id.
Id. at 1086, 1107 (finding "facts themselves are not copyrightable because '[t]he sine
93.
qua non of copyright is originality' and holding "undisputed facts establish that the players do
not have a right of publicity in their names and playing records as used in CBC's fantasy games
and that CBC has not violated the players' claimed right of publicity").
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505
94.
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that "it would be strange law that a person would not
have a First Amendment right to use information that is available to everyone").
Major League Baseball Advanced Media v. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. 553 U.S.
95.
1090 (2008).
Terms of Use Agreement, supra note 77.
96.
See Jacqui Cheng, NFL Fumbles DMCA Takedown Battle, Could Face Sanctions,
97.
ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2007, 12:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2007/03/nflfumbles-dmca-takedown-battle-could-face-sanctions.ars.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
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under the DMCA.oo Refusing to be intimidated, Seltzer struck back
with a counternotification under section 512(g)(3) (which enabled
YouTube to restore the clip to its server for public performance)10 1 by
which she effectively challenged the NFL to take her to court. 102 The
NFL attempted another takedown notification, but it ultimately
backed down, unwilling to test its infringement theory in court.10 3
However, few potential copyright defendants are as well versed
in their legal rights as Wendy Seltzer, and even fewer are willing to
risk defending their legal rights against a multibillion-dollar
corporation. 10 4 Despite Seltzer's bold stand, individuals in her position
possess only limited means to combat overreaching claims. Even
though making such fraudulent claims effectively chills a wide swath
of protected activity, the law makes little relief available against the
The Copyright Act effectively incentivizes the
deception. 105
propagation of such false information. As a result, such overreaching
statements serve as a powerful vehicle to extend the breadth of the
copyright monopoly with few adverse consequences for their
disseminators.
II. CURBING COPYBLIGHT
"Everybody talks about the weather," Mark Twain once
reportedly mused, "but nobody does anything about it."106 While the
problem of copyblight is challenging, it is-thankfully-less
intractable than the weather. With Twain's admonition in mind, the
dangerous consequences of copyright overreach demand consideration
of how best to curb copyblight. To that end, this Article advances
three proposals: (1) strengthening the DMCA's section 512(f) to
provide a more viable claim against individuals or entities that make
false representations, including overreaching claims of copyright
100.

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).

Id. § 512(g)(3) (requiring that service providers seeking the DMCA safe harbor,
101.
"replace( the removed material and cease( disabling access to it not less than 10, nor more than
14, business days" following receipt of a counter-notification, unless suit is filed in federal court
before that time).
102.
Letter from Wendy Seltzer to DMCA Complaints, YouTube, Inc. (Feb. 14, 2007),
availableat http://wendy.seltzer.org/media/DMCA-counter-notification.pdf.
103.
Cheng, supra note 97.
104.
Surprisingly, the NFL did not ultimately pursue action against Seltzer for
subsequently reproducing its DMCA takedown demand to YouTube on her website. See E-mail
from National Football League to YouTube, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://wendy.
seltzer.org/media/NFLAntipiracyo3 takedown_2007.02.13.txt. It was, after all, the unauthorized
reproduction of a creative work under the NFL's legal theory. See id.
105.
See supra Part II.A.
106.
Mark Twain Quotes, NOTABLE QUOTES, http://www.notable-quotes.com/titwainmark.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
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protection, to force the removal of allegedly infringing content online;
(2) making grants of attorneys' fees mandatory under section 505,
thereby forcing the long-elusive evenhanded treatment of prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants in copyright suits; and (3) resurrecting a qui
tam civil cause of action for false "markings" under the Copyright Act
to disincentivize the (presently ubiquitous) use of fraudulent legal
language that erodes and chills protected activities.
A. Modifying Section 512(f's Good Faith Requirement
We begin by considering the impact of the DMCA's takedown
provisions on legitimate uses of creative works. The DMCA, of course,
provides a mechanism for genuine rights holders to force Internet
service providers to remove infringing content placed online at the
direction of users. 107 Upon cursory examination, it also appears to
safeguard against abuses of the takedown procedure. First, the
complaining party must attest to aspects of its takedown notification
under penalty of perjury.10 8 But, it turns out, that attestation is
arguably limited to the complaining party's statement that it is
"authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
Secondly, the DMCA appears to provide
allegedly infringed."1 09
parties, such as the NFL in the
complaining
against
meaningful relief
Seltzer controversy described above, 110 who overreach in their
demands to Internet service providers for the takedown of allegedly
infringing materials online. Specifically, the DMCA creates a civil
cause of action against those who "knowingly materially
misrepresent[] . . . that material or activity is infringing""n

in an

Typically, a person challenging a
online takedown notification.
takedown notification will argue that the copyright owner knowingly
and materially misrepresented having "a good faith belief that use of
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized," as
required under section 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 112
However, as it turns out, judicial interpretation of the mental
state required to prove a knowing material representation has made
success on a section 512(f) action under the DMCA improbable. For
example, the leading case on the mens rea requirement in section
512(f), Rossi v. MPAA, held that the "good faith belief' requirement
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (providing for takedown notice procedure for infringing
107.
"information residing on systems or networks at direction of users").
Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
108.
Id.
109.
110.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
111.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1).
112.
Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
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was entirely subjective, not objective. 113 "A copyright owner cannot be
liable simply because an unknowing mistake is made," the court
found, "even if the copyright owner acted unreasonably in making the
mistake." 114 Instead, the court required "a demonstration of some
actual knowledge of misrepresentation" before imposing liability on a
party serving a DMCA takedown.u 5
Though such a reading may be consonant with Congress's
intent, it makes for troubling policy. Specifically, a party issuing a
takedown notice can escape section 512(f) liability by possessing a
subjective, good faith belief that the activity about which it complains
constitutes infringement. 1 16 This standard is problematic given that
some factions in the content-creation industries believe that virtually
all uses of copyrighted works require licenses.11 7 As a result of these
inaccurate beliefs, a veritable Kool-Aid defense arises: if a copyright
holder "drinks the Kool-Aid" of these factions (and therefore lacks
subjective bad faith in sending out an overreaching takedown
notification), it cannot suffer liability under section 512(f), no matter
The infamous Lenz v.
how objectively unreasonable its belief.
1
18
Universal case is illustrative of the problem.
The dispute that led to
the suit began when a young mother named Stephanie Lenz uploaded
a twenty-nine-second home video that featured her toddler son
bouncing around to the sounds of Prince's 1984 hit Let's Go Crazy,
which was playing in the background.11 9 Lenz was using YouTube as
a convenient way to share the footage with family and friends. 120
However, Universal Studios also quickly took an interest in the
video. 12 1 As the owner of sound recording copyright for Let's Go Crazy,
Universal promptly sent YouTube a takedown notification under
section 512(c)(3)(A), claiming that the video infringed the company's
copyright in the sound recording.12 2 Universal's uncompromising

113.
114.

Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1005.

115.

Id.

116.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). The DMCA requires that the complaining party serving
a takedown notice have a "good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of
is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law." Id.
117.
James Boyle, Afterword to KEITH AOKI ET AL., TALES FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
BOUND BY LAW? 67-70 (2006) (critiquing content-creation industries' nurturing of a "permissions
culture," where every use of a creative work requires permission and payment to a putative
rights holder).
118.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
119.
Id. at 1151-52.
120.
Id. at 1152.
121.
See id.

122.

Id.
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desire to force the removal of a seemingly sweet 23 recording of a son
taken by his mother gained widespread media attention. 124 After
several rounds of procedural machinations, Lenz ultimately filed suit
against Universal claiming, inter alia, that Universal had made a
knowing material misrepresentation to YouTube that her video
infringed Universal's copyright. 125
Initially, the court dismissed Lenz's complaint for failing to
allege "a knowing misrepresentation," 12 6 but Lenz proceeded to amend
her complaint. 127 Then, in an issue of first impression, 128 the court
found that, to possess the necessary good faith belief required for a
proper takedown notification under the DMCA, a complaining party
"must evaluate whether the material makes fair use of the
copyright." 129 Even so, the court nevertheless admitted that instances
of liability under section 512(f) are rare, given the subjective bad faith
standard:
Although there may be cases in which such considerations will arise, there are likely to
be few in which a copyright owner's determination that a particulari use is not fair use
will meet the requisite standard of subjective bad faith required to prevail in an action

for misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).130

As such, the odds of Lenz prevailing on her section 512(f) action
remain exceedingly low. Indeed, it appears that one can avoid section
512(f) liability by simply "drinking the Kool-Aid" unabashedly-so
long as the copyright holder truly believes the voices of the
maximalists, who have asserted that virtually all uses of copyrighted
works require licenses, the takedown notification will qualify as one
made in good faith for the purposes of section 512(f).
Courts have further enervated the vigor of section 512(f) by
limiting the relief allowed in its remedies provisions. Section 512(f)(2)
entitles victims of takedown notifications brought in bad faith to
recover damages and attorneys' fees incurred because of the
Mainstream audiences apparently did not realize that the child was dancing to a
123.
song replete with references to phone sex and "purple bananas."
See, e.g., Chris Francescani, The Home Video Prince Doesn't Want You to See, ABC
124.
77 76
51.
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/home-video-prince/story?id=3
2008).
(N.D.
Cal.
1153
2d
1150,
F.
Supp.
Corp.,
572
Lenz v. Universal Music
125.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF, 2008 WL 962102, at *3 (N.D.
126.
Cal. Apr. 8, 2008) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss with leave to amend as to claims 1 and
2 and without leave to amend as to claim 3).
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
127.
Id. at 1154 ("Whether fair use qualifies as a use 'authorized by law' in connection
128.
with a takedown notice pursuant to the DMCA appears to be an issue of first impression. Though
it has been discussed in several other actions, no published case actually has adjudicated the
merits of the issue.").
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006)).
129.
Id. at 1155 (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th
130.
Cir. 2004)).
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takedown.131 But, courts have read the scope of recoverable damages
and fees narrowly, finding that damages must be "proximately caused
by the misrepresentation to the service provider and the service
provider's reliance on the misrepresentation," 132 as opposed to "all
damages that occur as a "'but for' result of the misrepresentation." 13 3
Moreover, plaintiffs can only recover fees related to pre-litigation
activity ("i.e., in drafting and issuing the counter notice")-not all fees
for litigating a section 512(f) claim itself. 134
The state of the law on section 512(f) is emblematic of a
dramatically unbalanced aspect of the present copyright regime. No
state of mind, even if innocent, can protect a defendant from liability
for the direct infringement of a copyright holder's exclusive rights. 135
By sharp contrast, courts require a showing of subjective bad faith
before they will impose liability on a putative rights holder who
misrepresents its rights and stifles the legitimate activities of a user
through the DMCA takedown procedure. To remedy this inequity and
advance greater respect for all rights secured under the Copyright
Act-both those of owners and users-Congress should modify section
512(f)'s bad faith standard to reflect an objective, rather than
subjective, standard for liability.
The Appendix to this Article
contains one example of how a revised section 512(f) might look. 136
B. Equalizing Grants of Attorneys'Fees under Section 505
Beyond adjusting the law applying to Internet takedowns,
broader reforms related to actual infringement litigation could help
equalize the playing field between users and creators, and curb the
problem of copyblight. In particular, the imbalance between plaintiffs
and defendants in copyright suits is particularly notable when courts
render fees awards. The adoption of effective fee-shifting provisions
could provide a powerful disincentive against copyright overreach.
Unfortunately, however, the way in which many courts have
implemented the extant attorneys' fees provisions of the Copyright Act
131.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(2).
132.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-3783 JF, 2010 WL 702466, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2010).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. (emphasis added).
135.
For direct copyright infringement, mens rea is irrelevant to the fact of liability. See,
e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (holding that "[i]ntention to
infringe is not essential" for copyright liability). However, state of mind can impact the amount of
liability, but only if a plaintiff elects to receive statutory damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(allowing courts, in their discretion, to reduce statutory damages to as low as $200 per act of
innocent infringement).
136.
See infra Appendix.
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has played a key role in failing to stem the tide of overreaching
copyright claims. 137
1. Fogerty and Competing Fees Standards
Under section 505 of the Copyright Act, prevailing parties can,
at the court's discretion, recover attorneys' fees. 138 On the surface,
such a provision would appear to dissuade plaintiffs from pursuing
meritless claims of infringement, lest the defendants receive their fees
as a prevailing party. However, despite the absence of any statutory
language distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants,
many courts historically applied a bifurcated standard on the fees
question, depending on which side prevailed: defendants generally
faced greater difficulty in recovering fees, even in relatively one-sided
cases.139 Since the cost of litigation is one of the most salient factors
preventing individuals from fighting overreaching copyright claims, 140
reform of the recovery of attorneys' fees is a necessary step to
equalizing the playing field between content owners and users.
Prior to 1994, many courts, including the copyright-rich U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, explicitly
adopted an unbalanced approach to the award of fees under section
These courts would routinely grant fees to prevailing
505.141
plaintiffs, 142 but deny them to prevailing defendants absent a finding
of frivolousness or bad faith-an exacting standard. 143 As the U.S.
137.
138.
139.

See infra note 135.
17 U.S.C. § 505.
See infra note 135.

140.

See generally AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC

SURVEY: 2011 35 (2011). According to the Report of the Economic Survey conducted by the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, to litigate even a small (less than $1 million at
risk) copyright infringement trial in 2010 costs a whopping $350,000 in attorneys' fees, on
average. See id.
See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Because
141.
section 505 is intended in part to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter
infringement, and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally awarded to a prevailing
plaintiff." (citations omitted)); Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir.
1984) ("Fees to a prevailing defendant should not be awarded when the plaintiffs claim is
colorable since such awards would diminish the intended incentive to bring such claims."). It is
unclear just how this unevenhanded approach came to life, and as the Supreme Court ultimately
would hold, there is nothing in the text of the Copyright Act's attorneys' fees provision that
warrants the use of an unbalanced approach. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 n.11
(1994).
Frank Music Corp. v. MGM, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Plaintiffs in
142.
copyright actions may be awarded attorney's fees simply by virtue of prevailing in the action: no
other precondition need be met, although the fee awarded must be reasonable.").
See, e.g., Warner Bros. Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir.
143.
1989) (stating that there exists a "heavier burden imposed upon defendants who seek fees");
Olson v. NBC, Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to adopt an evenhanded
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Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated in 1987, "[C]ourts
generally have agreed that defendants are entitled to fees . . . only
when the claims are frivolous or are brought in bad faith." 14 4
Things appeared to change in 1994, when Fogerty v. Fantasy,
Inc. reached the Supreme Court. 145 In that case, Credence Clearwater
Revival's old record label, Fantasy, sued the band's lead singer, John
Fogerty, for copyright infringement. 14 6 The case garnered immediate
headlines because of one unusual fact-Fantasy had accused Fogerty
of effectively infringing himself. 147 Specifically, Fantasy charged that
Fogerty's solo work The Old Man Down the Road infringed his classic
Run Through the Jungle, to which Fantasy owned the copyright. 148
Due to the acrimony between the two sides, 149 the case went all the
way to trial, where a jury ultimately ruled in favor of Fogerty. 15 0 As a
prevailing defendant, Fogerty then sought recovery of his attorneys'
fees and then appealed after the district court denied his motion.15 1
This appeal ended up before the Supreme Court over the proper
standard that courts should apply in analyzing recovery of fees under
section 505.152
In the case, the Supreme Court overruled the
predominant practice of the time and rejected outright the dual
standard for fees, ordering hereafter that "[p]revailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants are to be treated alike" under section 505.153
The Court reasoned:
Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek to
advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate

approach to awarding fees). But see Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.
1986) (adopting an evenhanded approach to the grant of attorneys' fees under the Copyright Act
in the Third Circuit).
144.
Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 809 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
145.
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 517.
146.
Id. at 519-20.
147.
See id.; see also James Sullivan, John Fogerty Sued for Plagiarizing. . . Himself
Twisted Tales, SPINNER (May 14, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.spinner.com/2010/05/14/johnfogerty-creedence-clearwater-revival.
148.
See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 519-20.
149.
Fogerty and Fantasy's owner, Saul Zaentz, had a famous falling out and the suit
was one among several disputes between them. Matthew Bolin, When Good Albums Happen to
Bad People: John Fogerty, "Centerfield",POPDOSE (Mar. 8, 2010), http://popdose.com/when-goodalbums-happen-to-bad-people-john-fogerty-centerfield.
150.
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 520.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 534.
153.
Id.
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them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of
15 4
infringement.

Although the Court eschewed any particular test of the provision of
fees, preferring an imprecise reliance on "equitable discretion,"15 5 it
did reference a non-exclusive list of factors that the lower courts might
objective
motivation,
"frivolousness,
including
consider,
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of
the case), and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence." 5 6 Regardless of what
standard lower courts used, the Supreme Court insisted that the
judiciary treat prevailing plaintiffs and defendants evenhandedly.
2. The Dual Standard's Continued Survival Post-Fogerty
Nevertheless, since 1994, a dual standard continues to prevail.
An empirical study conducted in 2000 analyzed 260 reported fees
decisions both before and after the Fogerty case. 157 Although it found
that the rate at which defendants received their fees in copyright
infringement cases increased substantially after the Fogerty decision,
there was still a marked disparity between the grant of fees to
plaintiffs and defendants. First, the rate at which plaintiffs received
their fees (89 percent) was exactly the same both before and after
Fogerty.58 In other words, despite the Supreme Court's admonition
otherwise,15 9 lower courts continue to grant fees routinely to
Second, the data suggest that it is still
prevailing plaintiffs.
significantly more difficult for prevailing defendants to recover fees
than it is for prevailing plaintiffs. 6 0 As the author of the study
154.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 534 (noting that 'there is no precise rule or formula for making these
155.
determinations,' but instead equitable discretion should be exercised 'in light of the
considerations we have identified."' (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1983))).
156.
Id. at 535 n.19 (quoting Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir.
1986)).
See Jeffrey Edward Barnes, Comment, Attorney's Fee Awards in Federal Copyright
157.
Litigation After Fogerty v. Fantasy: Defendants Are Winning Fees More Often, But the New
StandardStill Favors PrevailingPlaintiffs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1381, 1382 (2000).
Id. at 1389-90.
158.
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 533-34. The court stated:
159.
Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney's fees in the
court's discretion, we find it impossible to believe that Congress, without more,
intended to adopt the British Rule [granting fees as a matter of right]. Such a bold
departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn more explicit statutory
language and legislative comment.
Id.
Barnes, supra note 157, at 1390. Of course, there could be other explanations for the
160.
continued disparity, including sample bias from the types of cases that reach a full adjudication
on the merits.
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bluntly concluded, "Fogerty has not changed a prevailing defendant's
need to show that [the opposing party's] conduct during the course of
litigation is culpable in order to win a fee award."16 1 Thus, in many
cases, courts seem to mandate that defendants show frivolousness or
bad faith conduct by the plaintiff in order to receive fees, which is
something they do not require prevailing plaintiffs to demonstrate.
An anecdotal examination of the case law appears to confirm
The Ninth Circuit-home of
the empirical survey's findings.
Hollywood and the entertainment industry-has continued to award
fees to plaintiffs as a general matter of right. For example, in the
notable Krypton opinion from 1997,162 the Ninth Circuit held that "a
plaintiff in a copyright action is generally awarded fees by virtue of
prevailing in the action" 163 though Fogerty says no such thing and,
instead, mandates a balancing of factors that courts should use to
determine the award of fees to either a plaintiff or defendant under an
evenhanded approach.164 Although the court decided this case some
three years after the Fogerty decision, the Ninth Circuit never cited
Fogerty and inexplicably ignored its core holding against the adoption
of a British-style rule where courts grant fees as a matter of right. 6 5
There is also no plausible basis to think that the Ninth Circuit
accidentally overlooked Fogerty. Indeed, the Krypton opinion shows
that the Ninth Circuit was quite familiar with Fogerty-on several
occasions during the course of the ruling, the Ninth Circuit refers to
its own (overruled) decision in Fogerty for non-fees-related
propositions. 166

Id. at 1396.
161.
162.
Columbia Pictures Television v. Krypton Bd. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 296
(9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340
(1997).
Id. The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the fees award of the lower court because
163.
the lower court had not provided any basis for the fees award. Id. at 297. However, in so doing,
the court appeared far more concerned about its ability to ascertain the reasonableness of the
award, not the fact of the award itself. Id. at 296. As the court wrote:
This Circuit has a "long-standing insistence upon a proper explanation of any fee
award" by a district court. The district court, rather than providing a reasoned
explanation of its fee award, simply included the entire amount requested in the final
judgment. Thus, without expressing any opinion on whether or not the fees claimed
were reasonable, we must vacate the district court's fee award and remand the matter
so that the district court may provide a reasoned explanation supporting the amount
of fees awarded.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 623 (9th Cir. 1993)).
164.
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534. "Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be
treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the
court's discretion." Id. The Court therefore rejected the adoption of a British rule granting fees
generally to prevailing plaintiffs (or prevailing defendants). Id.
165.
Id. at 533-34.
166.
Krypton, 106 F.3d at 290.
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Meanwhile, post-Fogerty, courts continue to deny defendants
fees absent "bad faith motivation (such as to dominate the market in
question), hard-ball tactics [such as discovery abuse] . . . or objective

unreasonableness (such as pursuing a claim against a defendant after
dismissal of the identical claim against a co-defendant)." 167 Thus, to
receive fees, many courts still appear to require a demonstration of
extraordinary gall and bad judgment by the plaintiff. In Bond v.
Blum, for example, the plaintiff was an author who had written an
autobiographical manuscript detailing his act of patricide when he
was seventeen.168 His ex-wife managed to obtain a copy of the
manuscript and produced it as an exhibit in custody proceedings to
demonstrate that her former husband would not provide an
environment suitable for children. 169 Plaintiff then sued his ex-wife
and her law firm for copyright infringement, tenuously yet tenaciously
arguing that they had engaged in the unauthorized reproduction of his
copyrighted manuscript. 17 0 The court found the defendants' use of the
manuscript squarely protected by the fair use doctrine and awarded
fees to the defendants on the grounds that the infringement case was
"not a close one."17 1 As the court held, the suit was frivolous and
motivated by a desire to suppress the underlying facts of the plaintiffs
work-not to protect the creative expression embodied in the
manuscript.172
Similarly, a court granted attorneys' fees to the defendant in
Hofheinz v. AMC Productions when bad faith motivations for the
litigation came to light.173 In the case, a widow retracted what
appeared to be a grant of permission for the use of movie clips, posters
and photographs in a documentary when she did not like the movie's
final cut. 174 She then sued for infringement.17 5 The court awarded
fees on the grounds that the case was brought for improper
Specifically, the timing of the objection strongly
purposes. 7 6
suggested an ulterior motive to ensure that the documentary
showcased her husband in a more favorable light. 177 The court found

167.
168.
169.

4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (MB) § 14.10(D)(3)(b) (2011) (footnotes omitted).
Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 391.

170.

Id.

171.
Id. at 398.
172.
Id. at 397-98.
Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., No. CV-00-5827 (CPS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16940, at
173.
*18-19 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2003).

174.
175.

Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.

176.

Id. at *18-19.

177.

Id. at *18.
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the claim objectively unreasonable and frivolous, thereby warranting
an award of fees to the defendant.1 7 8 However, absent such egregious
behavior by a plaintiff, a defendant is far less likely to receive an
award of fees.
3. Fees and Artistic Expression: The Koons Cases
Consider the predicament of notorious appropriation artist Jeff
Koons, who has faced accusations of copyright infringement in two
high-profile lawsuits. 179 His encounters with the court system in these
cases epitomize the troubles facing a defendant raising a fair use
defense. In 1989, Koons was famously sued successfully in an artistic
appropriation case involving his unauthorized transformation of a
photograph into a satirical sculptural work.1 80 In that suit, the court
rejected his fair use defense and found him liable for copyright
infringement. 181 Although the holding did not produce a reported
decision on Koons's liability for the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees under
section 505, the court strongly hinted at their likely recoverability,
styling Koons's actions in an unfavorable light and noting that the
plaintiff was a good candidate for additional relief beyond ordinary
damages.182
Several years later, Koons found himself in court again. In
Blanch v. Koons, the plaintiff owned the copyright to a photograph
entitled "Silk Sandals by Gucci"-a commercial work used in
advertising.183 Koons usurped the image, reproducing a portion of it
for his painting "Niagara," which had been commissioned by Deutsche
Bank. 184 This time, however, the court found that the fair use doctrine
protected Koons's activities as a form of transformative
appropriation. 185 Koons then petitioned the court for fees as a
prevailing defendant, but the court denied his request, reasoning that
attorney's fees were not appropriate since the suit was neither
frivolous nor brought in bad faith. 18 6 Such a result is typical
post-Fogerty.187 As Melville Nimmer notes, "most courts deny fees to
Id. at *20-21.
178.
179.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
180.
Id. at 305-06.
181.
Id. at 312.
182.
Id. at 313. As the Second Circuit noted in remanding the case to the district court,
"given Koons' wilful [sic] and egregious behavior, we think Rogers may be a good candidate for
enhanced statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)." Id.
183.
Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 479.
184.
Id. at 480-82.
185.
186.
Blanch v. Koons, 485 F. Supp. 2d 516, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
187.
See Barnes, supra note 157, at 1396.
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claims were neither

By the same token, there is

typically no award of fees in cases involving issues of first impression
or advancing claims that were neither frivolous nor objectively
unreasonable."18 8
Interestingly, the Blanch decision sent a warning to Koons and
others like him. As an appropriationist artist, reasoned the court,
Koons knowingly took the risk of copying others' works even though
the Copyright Act had protected him. 189 Unconcerned with the
chilling effect such a ruling might have on future fair use in the arts,
the court unsympathetically commented that: "appropriation artists
can expect that their work may attract lawsuits. They must accept the
risks of defense, including the time, effort, and expenses involved."19 0
However, such a result fails to make Koons whole. In winning the
case and successfully fending off charges of copyright infringement,
Koons still found himself out of pocket for over one million dollars in
attorneys' fees and costs. 191 This result precludes all but the most
wealthy celebrity artists from defending a suit with a meritorious fair
use defense.
Thus, in the Rogers and Blanch cases, two copyright
infringement claims involving issues of fair use and the
appropriationist works of Jeff Koons end in strikingly different
results. In the first-where the plaintiff established liability-the
plaintiff was likely to get fees. In the second-where the defendant
prevailed under a fair use defense-the defendant was unable to
recover fees. In effect, despite the admonitions of the Supreme Court
to the contrary, a dual standard for grants of fees apparently
continues to prevail.
4. Fees and Political Speech: The Savage Incident
This continuing asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants
does not merely impact artists making transformative uses of
copyrighted content; rather, it can suppress core political speech
rights as well. Recently for example, the conservative talk show host
Michael Savage sued the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR), an advocacy group whose mission is to promote understanding
of Islam and to protect the civil liberties of Muslim-Americans. CAIR
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 167 (footnote omitted).
188.
Blanch, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82. All the while, however, the court found that none
189.
of the four fair use factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff (three favored the defendant and one
was neutral) and, therefore, Koons had made fair use of the photograph as a matter of law. Id.
Blanch, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
190.
Id.
191.
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had excerpted approximately four minutes of Savage's two-hour
broadcast from October 27, 2007 without authorization. 19 2 During the
broadcast, Savage had deemed the Koran to be "a book of hate" and
referred to Muslims as "throwback[s]" who deserved deportation
"without due process," declaring that "I don't want to hear one more
word about Islam."193 Savage then told Muslims to "[t]ake your
religion and shove it up your behind. I'm sick of you," and he exhorted
his fans to "[s]peak it out at the supermarket! Tell them what you
think of Islam. Tell them what you think of Muslims. Tell them what
you think of these things." 194 Savage's religious invective drew
widespread criticism and, to draw further attention to his
controversial statements, CAIR appended one of its own Internet
articles with excerpts of the broadcasts.19 5 Entitled National Radio
Host Goes on Anti-Muslim Tirade, the article critiqued Savage's
Islamophobic vitriol and encouraged "radio listeners of all faiths to
Savage's
Michael
on
that
advertise
companies
contact
nationally-syndicated radio program to express their concerns about
the host's recent anti-Muslim tirade." 196 In short, the use of Savage's
broadcast appeared to be a quintessential form of commentary and
criticism, immunized from liability both under the strictures of
copyright law's fair use doctrine and the First Amendment's protection
of core political speech. 197 Savage, however, felt that CAIR had
illicitly impinged on his exclusive dominion over his intellectual
property; he therefore sued the organization for copyright
infringement in a California federal district court. 198
The court quickly dispensed with the suit, granting a motion
for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the fair use doctrine
protected CAIR's actions as a matter of law. 199 Nevertheless, the court
denied CAIR's subsequent motion for attorneys' fees.2 00 Although the
192.
Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations, Inc., No. C 07-6076 SI, 2008 WL
2951281, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008).
193.
Brave New Films 501(C)(4) v. Weiner, No. C 08-04703 SI, 2009 WL 1622385, at *1
n.1 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2009) (denying plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment);
11,
2007),
(Nov.
Tirade, CAIR
National Radio Host Goes on Anti-Muslim
http://www.cair.com/Article Details.aspx?mid1=777&&ArticlelD=23608.
194.
Id.; Michael Savage, CAIR (Nov. 1, 2007, 11:40 AM), http://www.cair.com/audio
savage 102907.asp.
See Our Vision, Mission and Core Principles,CAIR, http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/
195.
VisionMissionCorePrinciples.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
196.
National Radio Host Goes on Anti-Muslim Tirade,supra note 193.
See Savage, 2008 WL 2951281, at *6.
197.
Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730 (N.D. Cal.
198.
July 25, 2008).
199.
Id. at 1738.
200.
Savage v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels., Inc., No. C 07-06076 SI, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4926, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009).
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court admitted that "[p]laintiff's Copyright Act claim was 'never strong
and was litigated anemically,"' 201 the court simply denied defendant's
request for an award of fees. 202 The court affirmed this opinion upon a
motion for reconsideration. 2 03
By denying CAIR's motion for fees, the court failed to
disincentivize overreaching claims. So it is not surprising that,
shortly thereafter, Savage attempted to silence other groups by using
similarly tenuous claims over the same piece of intellectual
property. 204 This time Savage targeted Brave New Films, which had
incorporated one minute of Savage's comments-only a quarter of
CAIR's use-as part of a media piece it had prepared on his
anti-Muslim views and had posted on YouTube. 205 Despite the court's
ruling of fair use over the exact same footage in the CAIR case,
Savage's company-Original Films-claimed that Brave New Films
had infringed its rights. 206 The company filed a takedown notice with
YouTube pursuant.to the DMCA. 2 07 YouTube removed the video just
after Brave New Films took out a full-page advertisement in the New
York Times with a link to the video. 208 The blow to Brave New Films
was significant; the takedown thoroughly neutered the power of its
concentrated outreach campaign.
Although Brave New Films
ultimately sued so that it could have its use of the video restored, the
damage had already been done; in the end, without a grant of fees to
CAIR, Savage's disingenuous and abusive use of copyright law went
undeterred.2 09

201.

Id. at *2-3.

202.

See id.

203.

Id.

204.

Joan Brunwasser, Brave New Films Sues Shock Jock Michael Savage, OPEDNEWS

(Oct. 10, 2008, 4:19 PM), http://www.opednews.com/articles/Brave-New-Films-Sues-Shoc-byPress-Release-081010-626.html.
Id.
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
208.
See Plaintiff Brave New Films' Notice of Motion and Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Brave New Films 501(C)(4) v. Weiner, No. CV 08-04703 SI (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2009),
2009 WL 527974 at *1 ("As a result of that takedown notice, YouTube removed not only 'Michael
Savage Hates Muslims' from Brave New Films' channel, but disabled Brave New Films' entire
channel at a critical time in the presidential election cycle, rendering unavailable a large number
of videos that expressed important political views, and just as Brave New Films ran a full-page
ad in the New York Times.").
209.
See Stipulation and Order Dismissing Complaint at *2, Brave New Films 501(C)(4)
v. Weiner, No. 308CV04703 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 3413839.
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5. Fees Reform
In one sense, however, CAIR was fortunate; the courts at least
adjudicated its motion for fees on the merits. Not all defendants enjoy
that benefit.
This important, though underappreciated, fact
emphasizes the need for further reform. Specifically, a significant
number of infringement suits in which defendants prevail are
altogether exempted from a grant of fees under section 505. In many
circuits, if the court dismisses a case for lack of standing (for example,
brought on a false claim of copyright ownership), it precludes a court
from granting fees under section 505 on the theory that the court lacks
continuing subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and the defendant
has not prevailed on the merits.2 10 Barring the unusual imposition of
Rule 11 sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 211 such
a result protects misguided plaintiffs from having to pay fees even if
they bring weak claims of infringement over works for which they do
not possess rights.
The purpose of section 505 is not just to make the infringed
whole, but to vindicate the rights of non-infringers that overbearing
plaintiffs haul to court. 212 In this latter goal, however, the statute is
failing. Part of the problem may stem from the continued reliance of
the evenhanded approach on some notion of culpability. 2 13 As Peter
Jaszi presciently noted even before the Court issued Fogerty, since an
"inquiry into a nonprevailing plaintiffs culpability focuses solely on
behavior associated with the litigation, while inquiry into a
210.
Torres-Negron v. J & N Records, LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 164-65 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding
that a defendant who obtains dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot obtains fees
under section 505 of the Copyright Act since that party has not prevailed on the merits);
McCormick v. Amir Constr., Inc., No. CV 05-7456 CAS, 2008 WL 4534266, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
6, 2008) (declining to award attorneys' fees under section 505, despite invalid claim of copyright
ownership by plaintiff, based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to do so, but ultimately
granting fees under FED. R. APP. P. 38 for the appellate portion of the suit); cf. W.G. v. Senatore,
18 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a court lacks jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees
based on a claim if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over that claim); Cook v. Peter Kiewit
Sons Co., 775 F.2d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that a district court lacks the ability to
opine on the merits of a claim after deciding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the
claim).
211.
Of course, if a court lacks jurisdiction to grant fees after dismissing a case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, one could similarly argue that a court also lacks the ability to impose
Rule 11 sanctions on similar grounds. That said, courts have typically held that they retain
authority to impose Rule 11 sanctions, even absent subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute.
See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1990). But, of course, the standard
for a Rule 11 violation is quite high.
212.
Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That-The Defendant's Dilemma, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107, 121 (1992).
213.
As the Supreme Court has noted, trial courts should use their equitable discretion
in considering such factors as frivolousness, motivation, and objective unreasonableness. Fogerty
v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994).
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nonprevailing defendant's culpability includes the underlying
infringing activities," 2 14 an evenhanded approach that continues to
rely on notions of culpability will systematically disadvantage
prevailing defendants. 215 Making grants of fees mandatory, rather
than discretionary, might present one way to curb this tendency. 216
After all, prevailing plaintiffs already appear to receive fees in nine
out of every ten cases-close to a matter of right. Since infringement
suits are tremendously costly both to prosecute and defend against, a
mandatory grant of attorneys' fees to prevailing parties could play an
influential role in leveling the playing field in copyright litigation. If
courts consistently granted fees to prevailing defendants, defendants
would enjoy a greater ability to fend off claims by putative copyright
holders seeking to receive benefits not recognized by the law. This, in
214.
See Barnes, supra note 157, at 1385.
215.
Jaszi, supra note 212, at 122, 127.
216.
Such a proposal is, of course, not without potential problems. For instance, many
companies now transfer their copyrights to special purpose LLCs whose sole function is litigating
infringement claims. These LLCs are frequently undercapitalized. Thus, a defendant may be
limited in collecting a judgment for attorneys' fees against one of these LLCs (though the
copyright itself would presumably have some value). In addition, a mandatory grant of fees
might disincentivize defendants from fighting unreasonable damages demands by a plaintiff in
instances where the question of liability is settled but the calculation of damages remain. In
particular, defendants might reasonably fear that, by not settling early, they will only incur a
larger ultimate bill since they face exposure for the plaintiffs final attorneys' fees total. The use
of Rule 68 offers of judgment, which can shift fee liability, could address this problem. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 68. Specifically, under Rule 68, a defendant can make an offer of judgment to a plaintiff
on a claim and, if the plaintiff declines the offer of judgment and the ultimate "judgment that the
offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer," then "the offeree must
pay the costs incurred after the offer was made." Id. If the underlying statute giving rise to the
cause action defines fees as a species of costs, the Supreme Court has held that fees shift for Rule
68 purposes. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (allowing an award of fees under Rule
68 to a non-prevailing party when fees are defined as costs in the underlying statute). In these
circumstances, courts award fees to a non-prevailing party when the prevailing party earns at
trial less than the offer of judgment. See id. Since it states that "the court may also award a
reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs," 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006)
(emphasis added), section 505 of the Copyright Act appears to qualify for Marek treatment and
the shifting of fees under Rule 68. Yet the various circuit courts are split on this issue. Some
courts have shifted awards of fees to non-prevailing defendants when a judgment ultimately
obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer. See, e.g., Jordan v.
Time, Inc., 111 F.3d 102, 105 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Rule 68 award of costs includes
attorneys' fees, even if the defendant is not the prevailing party); Baker v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,
431 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a Rule 68 award of costs includes attorneys'
fees, even if the defendant is not the prevailing party). Others have refused. See, e.g., UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2011); Harbor
Motor Co. v. Arnell Chevrolet-Geo, Inc., 265 F.3d 638, 645-647 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that, for a
claim of copyright infringement, "only prevailing parties can receive attorney's fees pursuant
to Rule 68" (emphasis added)). To avoid any doubt and to bolster the power of Rule 68 to
encourage settlement, Congress should explicitly amend the Copyright Act to adopt a
compromise position between the split circuits. To wit, section 505 should state that no party is
prevailing when a judgment ultimately obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable than the
unaccepted offer.
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turn, would reduce the seductive lure of rights-overreach that has led
to widespread copyblight. The Appendix to this Article contains one
example of how a revised section 505 might look. 2 1 7

C. Resurrectinga Federal Cause of Action for False Copyright Claims
While section 505 reform could play a critical role in combating
copyblight, it would need augmentation for at least three reasons.
First, section 505 reform would do little to deter the widespread use of
warnings.
copyright
litigated)
(though rarely
overreaching
Internalized by many ordinary individuals as representing accurate
statements of the law, this form of copyblight represses countless
legitimate uses of copyrighted materials. Second, since the vast
majority of copyright disputes never reach the point of litigation, let
alone an adjudication on the merits that can trigger a fees motion,
section 505 reform would directly impact only a small subset of the
universe of copyright disputes. Third, for a certain class of cases
litigated to the point of a final resolution, section 505 is
inapplicable. 2 18 While section 505 reform can disincentivize copyblight
litigation when suits are brought by plaintiffs with proper standing, it
does little to curb copyblight litigation driven by plaintiffs who are
ultimately found to lack ownership rights to the allegedly infringed
work. Specifically, when a federal court determines that a plaintiff
lacks sufficient ownership rights to possess standing for an
infringement claim, the court is said to lack subject-matter
This absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction over the dispute.2 19
jurisdiction in turn renders the court unable to consider any
additional motions in the case, including a request for attorneys' fees
by defendants who have prevailed. 220
These limitations to section 505 reform highlight the need for
an additional revision to Title 17 of the United States Code: the
creation of a federal cause of action for false copyright claims. In the
past, Jason Mazzone has proposed that Congress amend the Copyright
Act to create a cause of action against copyfraud. 22 1 This suggestion is
not broad enough; the law should penalize all forms of copyblight by
providing relief against individuals and entities who make patently
and indisputably false claims of copyright ownership and against
objectively unreasonable statements about the extent of an owner's

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See infra Appendix.
See supra note 210 and
See supra note 210 and
See supra note 210 and
Mazzone, supra note 1,

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
at 1031.
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rights. Congress could model such a reform after section 512(f),
though it would have the added advantage of disincentivizing
overreaching copyright claims that are not subject to section 512(f),
which only applies in limited contexts for online takedown
notifications. 222
Indeed, present law punishes overreaching intellectual
property claims in certain limited arenas that, although worth
addressing, do less public harm than copyblight. For example, the
Copyright Act currently interdicts a failure by publishers to disclaim
copyright in portions of a work embodying government works. 223 More
pointedly, the Patent Act has provided a (recently neutered 224) cause
of action against the false marking of a product as patented. 225 And
yet, the problem of copyright overreach is far more pervasive and
dangerous than that of false claims to government works or false
patent marking. After all, the public legally enjoys the freedom to use
many works, not just those of the government,. without the
authorization of rights holders. 226 Moreover, unlike with patented
products, use of copyrighted works implicates important expressive

222.

See 17 U.S.C.

§ 512 (2006).

223.
Id. § 403.
Until recently, section 292(a) of the Patent Act provided for fines of "not more than
224.
$500" for every act of false marking. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). For many years, this provision generally
escaped criticism or rebuke. However, in 2009, the Federal Circuit took a rather broad
interpretation of what constituted an "offense" under the statute and held that plaintiffs could
multiply the section's statutory damages award by the literal number of actual goods falsely
marked by a defendant. See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (2009) (holding that
section 292's plain language requires courts to impose a fine for each and every false marking on
an unpatented article). Thus, post-Forest Group, a distributor selling one million widgets marked
with an expired patent mark suddenly faced potential liability in the amount of $500 million (one
million offenses multiplied by $500 in statutory damages per offense) under the statute.
Needless to say, this state of affairs resulted in the threat of absurdly large judgments against
technology companies. The American Invests Act, signed into law in 2011, quickly undid the
Federal Circuit's holding in Forest Group. See Andrew S. Dallmann, Patent False Marking and
the America Invents Act, PAT. LAW. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2011), http://patentlaw.jmbm
.comi/2011/10/patent-false-marking-and-the-a.html.
See 35 U.S.C. § 292(a). The act states:
225.
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any
unpatented article, the word "patent" or any word or number importing that the same
is patented for the purpose of deceiving the public; or Whoever marks upon, or affixes
to, or uses in advertising in connection with any article, the words "patent applied
for," "patent pending," or any word importing that an application for patent has been
made, when no application for patent has been made, or if made, is not pending, for
the purpose of deceiving the public-Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such
offense.
Id.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §107 (allowing the fair use of copyrighted works without the
226.
authorization of rights holders).
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and personhood interests. 227 While the impact of a false claim of
patenting often falls on sophisticated competing businesses-many of
which have access to patent counsel who can quickly dispel any
inaccuracies in the marking-one cannot say the same about a false
copyright claim. The digital age has increased public interaction with
copyright law in ways unforeseeable just a generation ago, 2 2 8 and
individuals often lack access to copyright counsel who could undo the
falsehoods spread by copyblight.
There are also long-forgotten historical analogues for
combating false copyright claims, though they are scarcely mentioned
in modern literature. 229 Starting in 1802, with the first amendment to
the Copyright Act, federal law began to provide a cause of action for
"false entry of copyright." 23 o According to the statute:
If any person or persons ... shall print or publish any map, chart, book or books, print
or prints, who have not legally acquired the copyright of such map, chart, book or books,
print or prints, and shall, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, insert
therein or impress thereon that the same has been entered according to act of Congress,
or words purporting the same, or purporting that the copyright thereof has been
acquired; every person so offending shall forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred dollars,
one moiety thereof to the person who shall sue for the same, and the other moiety
thereof to and for the use of the United States, to be recovered by action of debt in any
231
court of record in the United States having cognizance thereof.

In effect, the provision served as a private attorney general provision
that split recoveries for violations evenly between the plaintiff and the
United States government. 232 It remained on the books throughout
the nineteenth century, serving as a part of the federal copyright
scheme. 233 The provision was also harsh in its application, doling out
strict liability against violators. 234 As an article from an 1857 edition
of The New York Times noted, although an error might be "caused by
carelessness and inadvertence,

. .

. that none the less expose[d] the

parties to the penalties." 235

227.
See, e.g., John Tehranian, Parchment,Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP
(Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2011) (illustrating the
potent impact of copyright regulations on personhood interests).
228.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 4, 2 Stat. 171.
229.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
Id.
233.
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075. The claim endured in
robust form through 1909, when it suffered significant dilution. See id.
234.
Id,
Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1857, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free!
235.
pdfres=9FODEFD8173CEE34BC4B51DFB467838C649FDE. Ironically, the reproduction of the
column from the newspaper in 1857 provided by The New York Times on its website contains the
following language: "Published: December 23, 1857[.] Copyright 0 The New York Times." Id. If
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At the dawn of the twentieth century, however, the power of
the false-entry provision eroded significantly. The 1909 Copyright Act
radically altered the law on this count: Congress added a requirement
of "fraudulent intent" and eliminated the qui tam nature of the
claim. 2 36 The Act removed the private cause of action. Instead,
enforcement was left entirely to government discretion and deterrence
took the form of a misdemeanor publishable by a fine of between 100
The substantially weakened and scarcely
and 1000 dollars. 237
enforced provision quietly remains, like a vestigial tail, in the 1976
Copyright Act. 238
Not surprisingly, recent decades have seen increasingly
dubious copyright claims wreak havoc on the legitimate rights of the
public to access factual information. Such claims also limit the ability
of consumers to make use of creative works that have fallen into the
public domain or to engage in fair use of copyrighted works that
remain under legal protection. The reenactment of a qui tam federal
cause of action for any objectively unreasonable and false claim to
copyright ownership or exclusive rights over a work would balance the
copyright regime's treatment of user and owner rights.
Specifically, Congress could model a reenacted false claim
statute based on the 1802 qui tam provision and the modern section
512(f), which proscribes misrepresentations of material or activities
are infringing (while, of course, incorporating the alterations to section
512(f) this Article has already suggested). Since copyblight-like
copyfraud-"inflicts small injuries on many individuals" and
simultaneously "causes a more general injury to the public as a
whole," a false claims statute against copyblight-like Jason
Mazzone's proposal to remedy copyfraud-should "provide relief
broader than any plaintiffs individual injury."2 3 9 Yet the diffuse
impact of each act of copyblight makes actual damages difficult to
determine. A qui tam scheme that provides statutory damages large
enough to disincentivize copyblight, but not so onerous as to result in
unreasonable liability on businesses-especially those acting in good
faith-would ideally reflect the broad societal injury that copyblight
inflicts. It would also provide potential plaintiffs with the necessary
instigation to make an attack on significant misrepresentations about
the nature and scope of copyright worthwhile. The Appendix to this
section 11 of the 1831 Copyright Act were still in effect, The New York Times would have violated
it with this notification. Id.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
236.
Id. § 28.
237.
See 17 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2006) (allowing the government to impose fines of up to
238.
$2500 for appending fraudulent copyright notices to works).
239.
Mazzone, supranote 1, at 1086.
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Article contains one example of how a reenacted false claims statute
might look. 240
III. CONCLUSION

Copyblight's suppression of user rights is disturbingly
widespread and multifaceted. The Copyright Clearance Center and
major publishing houses earn millions of dollars in ill-gotten license
payments from students and academic institutions by glibly tossing
aside the "limited [t]imes" 2 41 requirement and claiming copyright
protection over public domain works. 242 Talk show hosts, law firms,
sports leagues, and major record labels overwhelm legitimate fair use
rightS243 when they suppress criticism of hate speech, 244 stifle public
commentary on legal positions and tactics, 245 claim exclusive rights to
any manner of use of their copyrighted content, no matter how
transformative or de minimis, 2 46 and, most infamously, tell a mother
that she cannot place on a YouTube a short video of her baby dancing
to unauthorized music. 2 47 Finally, University bookstores, big box
retailers, and MLB attempt to circumvent copyright's subject-matter
limitationS248 when they claim protection in book lists,249 product
pricing,25 0 and factual statistical data for playing fantasy sports. 251 In
all, countless organizations and entities flout numerous provisions of
federal law that protect the public interest by circumscribing the scope
of copyright protection.
Absent the imposition of significant legal consequences for its
perpetuation, copyblight will continue to spread. As Paul Heald once
warned, without the development of a sound public policy (including
punitive sanctions) to "jolt" industry into compliance, "consumers will
continue to be induced to part with their money by spurious claims of

240.

See infra Appendix.

241.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

242.
See supra Part I.B (discussing the Copyright Clearance Center example).
243.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
244.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the Michael Savage/CAIR example).
245.
See supra Part I.B-C (discussing the Dozier Internet Law, P.C. and National
Football League/Wendy Selzer examples).
246.
See supra Part I.B-C (discussing the copyright warnings of major publishers and
Major League Baseball).
247.
See supra Part II.A (discussing Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150
(N.D. Cal. 2008)).
248.
17 U.S.C. §102(b).
249.
See supra Part I.B (discussing the Harvard Coop example).
250.
See supra Part I.B (discussing the Wal-Mart example).
251.
See supra Part II.B (discussing the fantasy baseball example).
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That admonition, made almost two decades ago,
copyright." 252
remains true today, and consumers do not suffer just in their
pocketbooks. As a result, this Article seeks to curb copyblight by
proposing real legal consequences for its purveyors. The reforms
advocated here focus on three loci where copyblight has its biggest
effect: (1) in the sphere of commerce and discourse, where public
representations featuring sweepingly inaccurate statements about the
nature and scope of rights chill legitimate uses of copyrighted works;
(2) in the online environment, where improper takedown notifications
under the DMCA threaten to remove legitimate user-generated
content; and (3) in court, where the continued persistence of an
uneven standard for fees awards undermines the balance between
Federal law
plaintiffs and defendants in infringement cases.
(rightfully) offers meaningful remedies for the infringement of
legitimate owner rights. It only makes sense to offer meaningful
remedies.for the infringement of legitimate user rights. Though far.
from perfect, the three proposals advanced in this Article represent a
small step toward curbing the widespread problem of copyblight and
recognizing that the rights of users deserve the same respect as the
rights of copyright holders.

252.

Heald, supra note 7, at 282.
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APPENDIX

Section 505:
Current version
"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion
may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than
the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided
by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to
the prevailing party as part of the costs." 25 3
Potential new version
"In any civil action under this title, the court will award
recovery of full costs to a prevailing party against any party other
than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court will also award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs. For the purposes of
this Section, when a defendant makes an offer of judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and the plaintiff rejects said offer
of judgment and ultimately receives a judgment not more favorable
than the unaccepted offer of judgment, no party will be considered
prevailing."
Section 512(f):
Current version
"Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under
this section(1) that material or activity is infringing, or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by
mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer,
by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by
a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the
result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in
removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be

253.

17 U.S.C. § 505.
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infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable
access to it."254
Potential new version
"Any person who, without objective good faith or reasonable
consideration of any defenses (either legal or equitable) to claims of
infringement, misrepresents under this section-(1) that material or
activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or
disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any
damages, including costs and attorney's fees, incurred by the alleged
infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized
licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such
misrepresentation. Damages awards shall account for all 'but for'
such
consequences of the service provider relying upon
misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or
activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material
or ceasing to disable access to it. Damages awards shall also include
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in prevailing in a claim brought
under this subsection."
Qui Tam Statute:
Old version (from Chapter 11 of the 1831 Copyright Act)
"[I]f any person or persons, from and after the passing of this
act, shall print or publish any book, map, chart, musical composition,
print, cut, or engraving, not having legally acquired the copyright
thereof, and shall insert or impress that the same hath been entered
according to act of Congress, or words purporting the same, every
person so offending shall forfeit and pay one hundred dollars; one
moiety thereof to the person who shall sue for the same, and the other
to the use of the United States, to be recovered by action of debt, in
any court of record having cognisance thereof."2 55
Potential new version
"Any person who, without objective good faith or reasonable
consideration or mention of defenses (either legal or equitable) to
claims of infringement, misrepresents, in connection with the
distribution of goods or services, to the public that material or activity
254.
255.

Id. § 512(f).
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,

§

11, 4 Stat. 436, 438.
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is infringing shall be liable for statutory damages in the amount of no
less than $[TBD] and no more than $[TBD] per act of
misrepresentation, as determined at the discretion of the court. Any
person may sue for said statutory damages with one moiety thereof
going to the person who shall sue for the same, and the other to the
use of the United States, to be recovered by action of debt, in any court
of record having cognisance thereof."256

256.
To recognize the historical roots of this statute in Chapter 11 of the Copyright Act of
1831, the proposed language for a false "marking" statute would retain the charming,
antediluvian language referring to moieties. See id.

